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Facial beauty affects implicit and
explicit learning of men and women
differently
Eleni Ziori1* and Zoltán Dienes2
1 Department of Psychology, Faculty of Philosophy, Education and Psychology, School of Philosophy, University of Ioannina,
Ioannina, Greece, 2 Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK
The present work explores the unconscious and/or conscious nature of learning
attractive faces of same and opposite sex, that is, of stimuli that experimental and
neuroimaging research has shown to be rewarding and thus highly motivating. To this
end, we examined performance of men and women while classifying strings of average
and attractive faces for grammaticality in the experimental task of artificial grammar
learning (AGL), which reflects both conscious and unconscious processes. Subjective
measures were used to assess participants’ conscious and unconscious knowledge.
It was found that female attractiveness impaired performance in male participants.
In particular, male participants demonstrated the lowest accuracy while classifying
beautiful faces of women. Conversely, female attractiveness facilitated performance in
female participants. The pattern was similar for conscious and unconscious knowledge.
Presumably, objects with high incentive salience, as are beautiful faces, captured
resources, which were used in task relevant versus task irrelevant ways by women
versus men. The present findings shed light on the relation of conscious and
unconscious processing with affective and reward-related stimuli, as well as on gender
differences underlying this relation.
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Introduction
The motivational value of facial beauty has been evidenced both by laboratory-based research (e.g.,
Levy et al., 2008) and by numerous neuroimaging studies (e.g., Aharon et al., 2001; Kampe et al.,
2001; O’Doherty et al., 2003; Kranz and Ishai, 2006; Ishai, 2007). More speciﬁcally, functional brain
imaging studies have shown that facial beauty evokes activation in brain regions that are involved
in stimulus-reward associations (e.g., in the orbitofrontal cortex or the ventral striatum) and thus
form key structures that support aﬀect and emotion. Thus, beautiful faces can be thought of as
rewarding stimuli that activate brain regions involved in the processing of other primary rewards
(e.g., food and sexual contact; see e.g., Arana et al., 2003) or secondary rewards (e.g., monetary
gain; see e.g., Kringelbach and Rolls, 2004). Further, another main ﬁnding of the above studies
(O’Doherty et al., 2003; Kranz and Ishai, 2006; Ishai, 2007) is that attractive female faces elicit
stronger motivational/reward regions activation than attractive male faces ones in heterosexual
men, and that attractive male faces evoke stronger activation than attractive female faces in
heterosexual women. This pattern of neural activation reﬂects the emotional valence assigned to
attractiveness, which plays a signiﬁcant role in mating success.
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In a similar vein, Levy et al.’s (2008) study, which used
laboratory performance tasks, showed that facial beauty attracts
attention and has high incentive value. Levy et al. (2008)
examined the eﬀect of gender on the processing of facial beauty
by asking male and female participants to control the viewing
time of average or beautiful faces of men and women, as well as
to rate their attractiveness. The two groups of participants gave
similar ratings of heterosexual facial attractiveness. However,
men had the longest viewing time for beautiful female faces,
which was much longer than the corresponding time that women
had for beautiful males. Further, women had an increased viewing
time for both beautiful male and female faces, whereas men
focused only on beautiful female faces. The authors interpret
their ﬁndings in terms of gender-speciﬁc incentive sensitization
mechanisms.
There is substantial evidence that human behavior is to a large
extent driven by motives/rewards and goals (e.g., McClelland,
1985; Custers and Aarts, 2005; Aarts et al., 2007). A key issue is
whether motive driven behavior is a conscious process or whether
motives can be activated unconsciously and unintentionally.
Traditionally, motives were considered to involve an eﬀortful
and intentional process, which is activated with conscious
awareness. Further, implicit learning was traditionally equated
with a passive, unselective learning process that occurs without
directing people’s attention to the task at hand and regardless of
the relevance of stimulus structure to people’s goals or speciﬁc
motivations (e.g., Hayes and Broadbent, 1988; Lewicki et al.,
1992). However, contemporary empirical studies have shown that
implicit learning is sensitive to what is perceptually attended
(e.g., Tanaka et al., 2008; Eitam et al., 2009; Eitam and Higgins,
2010; Kiyokawa et al., 2012; Norman and Price, 2012) and
so may well be sensitive to the incentive salience of diﬀerent
stimuli.
Implicit learning is the acquisition of unconscious knowledge
(e.g., Reber, 1967, 1989; cf. Stadler and Frensch, 1994; Frensch,
1998). In the present work, we are focusing on one of the
most widely known experimental tasks that have been used
to study implicit learning, namely artiﬁcial grammar learning
(AGL).
In a typical AGL task (e.g., Reber, 1967), participants have to
simply observe a set of symbol strings, which are constructed on
the basis of a complex rule system (i.e., a ﬁnite state grammar).
After this training phase, participants are informed for the ﬁrst
time that the strings they had just observed were based on
certain complex rules, without receiving any further information
regarding the nature of these rules. Next, they are asked to
classify new strings, only half of which obey the rules of the
ﬁrst phase and are thus called grammatical (G) in opposition
to the other half, which are called non-grammatical (NG) as
they do not obey the rules. A typical ﬁnding of studies applying
the AGL task is that participants distinguish between G and
NG strings successfully without being able to report the rules
they relied on (e.g., Reber, 1967, 1976). The AGL paradigm
constitutes a type of implicit learning in that learning in the
context of this experimental paradigm occurs without intention
and results in knowledge that is not directly available to conscious
introspection.
The AGL task has traditionally used strings of letters,
shapes and other symbols involving no meaningful pre-existing
associations. More recent variations employed strings of stimuli
eliciting people’s prior knowledge and expectations, and showed
that implicit AGL reﬂects selective processes and may be aﬀected
by people’s prior (geography) knowledge (Ziori et al., 2014),
goals (Eitam et al., 2009), and motivational relevance (Eitam
and Higgins, 2010, 2014; Eitam et al., 2013; cf Eitam et al.,
2014 for evidence of implicit learning of faces when they were
task irrelevant). The present work aims to extend the above
AGL research in a diﬀerent knowledge-rich context and examine
whether the processing of beautiful faces, which have been shown
to trigger the reward center of brain, is associated more with
implicit or with explicit knowledge.
It should be noted at this point that many of the above studies
that have provided evidence of the reward value of facial beauty
draw on Berridge ’s (1996, 2000) distinction between “liking,” a
positive aﬀect that corresponds to assessments of attractiveness
and “wanting” or incentive salience, namely the psychological
component of reward that corresponds to key pressing measures.
“Liking” corresponds to the process of hedonic pleasure, that is,
to the emotional experience a particular object evokes. “Wanting”
as used by Berridge and Winkielman (2003) and Berridge (2009)
refers to “incentive salience,” which corresponds to a motivation
process that produces seeking behavior and is closely dependent
on the presence of the reward itself or of a cue that functions
as a reminder of that reward. “Wanting” and “liking” are two
constructs that are closely related in that when we like something,
in most cases, we want it. However, it has been suggested that the
two concepts are distinct and neurobiologically dissociable (e.g.,
Berridge and Robinson, 1998, 2003; Smith and Berridge, 2007).
In the AGL paradigm, motivational and esthetic aspects of
beauty are diﬃcult to disentangle. Presumably, both aspects are
involved as participants engage both in passive viewing, which is
associated more with liking, and in directing their attention to
faces that they desire or that work as reward cues, which may be
associated with a wanting process.
Many psychologists assume that aﬀective states (hedonic
experiences) are in essence conscious. However, according to
Wyvell and Berridge (2000), Berridge (2003), and Berridge
and Winkielman (2003), wanting and liking are two distinct
components of the “reward architecture,” whichmay operate both
explicitly (consciously) and implicitly (unconsciously). While
Berridge and Winkielman (2003) acknowledge that wanting as
used by most people refers to conscious cognitive desire, their
‘incentive salience “wanting,”’ is a more percept-driven process
that does not always need to be accompanied by conscious
awareness. Further, they provide evidence of subliminally
induced positive aﬀective reactions.
In the present work, we attempt to enlighten the relationship
of unconscious processing with aﬀective and reward-related
reactions by examining the implicit and/or explicit nature
of learning rewarding stimuli (i.e., attractive faces) in the
unintentional learning context of the AGL paradigm. To this end,
we replaced the original strings of letters used in Dienes and Scott
(2005, Experiment 2) with strings of people’s full-face photos. As
in the standard AGL task, participants ﬁrst observed the strings
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of faces, and in the test phase that followed, they judged them for
grammaticality.
As mentioned above, stimuli with high incentive salience
are generally thought to capture a greater amount of attention
resources and generate greater behavioral eﬀort in comparison
to stimuli of lower reward value (e.g., Levy et al., 2008; see also
Langlois et al., 1987, 1991). Studies on the role of attention
in implicit learning, in general, or in AGL, in particular, have
resulted in divergent ﬁndings and conclusions. This blurred
picture may be partly due to the diﬀerent meanings attributed to
the term attention (e.g., one that equates attention with cognitive
eﬀort and the availability of resources vs. one that views attention
as a selective process; see Jiang and Chun, 2003). For instance, it
has been suggested that executive resources are not required for
implicit AGL (Dienes and Scott, 2005; or are even detrimental
to implicit learning, Janacsek and Nemeth, 2013; Nemeth et al.,
2013), but perceptual resources are required (e.g., Tanaka et al.,
2008; Eitam et al., 2009; Kiyokawa et al., 2012).
So, stimuli with high incentive salience, as are attractive faces
of opposite or even of same sex (see the General Discussion
for possible hypotheses on this issue), are expected to guide
participants’ attention, which, in turn, could aﬀect performance,
and thus the acquisition of implicit and explicit knowledge
in diﬀerent ways. If incentive salience increases perceptual
processing, implicit learning should increase for attractive rather
than average faces, especially of the opposite sex. Conversely,
increased incentive salience might have the opposite eﬀect on
performance. For instance, according to Easterbrook’s (1959)
inﬂuential hypothesis, arousal, or increased drive leads to
attentional narrowing, namely to a reduction in the “range of cue
utilization” or “breadth of perceptive ﬁeld” (see also Gable and
Harmon-Jones, 2008, 2010a,b; Harmon-Jones and Gable, 2009).
Such an attentional narrowing might interfere with perceptual
processing, and accordingly impair implicit learning for attractive
rather than average faces, especially of the opposite sex. The
present work aims at clarifying the two opposing possibilities
concerning the eﬀect of incentive salience of beauty on perceptual
resources and consequently on implicit AGL.
Finally, if incentive salience increases only executive
processing, implicit learning should be unaﬀected (or even
impaired: Nemeth et al., 2013), and the above possibilities might
hold only for explicit learning; thus attractive faces, especially of
the opposite sex, should enhance explicit learning if they allocate
attentional resources in a global manner or reduce it if they act
in a more local way focusing, for instance, on the details of the
faces.
Materials and Methods
Design and Participants
Three main between-participant independent variables were
used, namely participants’ gender (female vs. male), beauty
(average vs. beautiful), and gender (women vs. men) of the
faces of people depicted in the photos. The present study
used the two grammars applied in Dienes and Scott (2005,
Experiment 2). Half of the participants were trained on grammar
A and the other half on grammar B. The test phase consisted
of an equal number of grammar A and grammar B items,
which were the same for all participants. The former test items
were grammatical and the latter ungrammatical for participants
trained on grammar A, while the reverse held for participants
trained on grammar B. Thus, grammar type was a fourth
between-participant independent variable.
One-hundred and twenty-six undergraduate students from
the University of Ioannina (64 females and 62males) participated
voluntarily. One fourth of the participants in each of the two
gender categories were allocated in each of the four gender
of faces by beauty cells. In each of the above four cells, half
of the female participants (i.e., eight participants) and almost
half of the male participants (i.e., either seven or eight) were
trained on grammar A and the other half on grammar B.
A criterion that had to be met for participation in the present
study was heterosexuality (or at least a clear attraction to the
opposite sex). Eight participants (two females and six males) were
excluded from the analyses, as the responses they provided on
two questions asking about their physical attraction and their
sexual behavior toward people of the opposite sex suggested
that the above criterion was not clearly satisﬁed. In particular,
at the end of the experiment, all participants had to answer
the following two questions: (A) To whom are you physically
attracted? (B) Which gender you had (or would like to have) a
sexual relationship with? The answers to both questions were:
(1) other sex only, (2) other sex mostly, (3) other sex somewhat
more, (4) both sexes equally, (5) same sex somewhat more, (6)
same sex mostly, (7) same sex only. The eight participants were
excluded because they had chosen replies four and upward in
the two questions. So, the data of a total of 118 students (62
females and 56males) were included in the analyses of the present
experiment.
The present research was ethically approved by the University
of Ioannina Research Committee. Informed consent was
obtained from all participants. At the end of the experimental
task, participants were also asked whether they wanted to answer
the anonymous questions regarding their sexual preferences
and they all accepted. It was emphasized that their replies and
personal data would be (and were indeed) treated conﬁdentially.
Materials
Stimulus construction was based on the two grammars, grammar
A and grammar B, used in Dienes and Scott (2005, Experiment
2). The original grammatical strings of each grammar were made
up from the letters M, T, V, R, and X, and had a length between
ﬁve and nine letters. A set of ﬁfteen grammatical strings was
repeated three times in diﬀerent random orders to create the
training set of each grammar. Each string length appeared equally
often in each training set. The unique test set was formed from a
random combination of thirty new strings from each grammar.
The proportion of strings of each length was kept constant in the
training and test sets.
To create the present strings, we replaced the letters of the
original strings with people’s full-face photos, such that each
letter corresponded to a unique face in each of the four gender
(women vs. men) by beauty (average vs. beautiful) categories
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of the faces. Thus, there were ﬁve faces of each sort (20 faces
in total). Each of four groups of men saw a diﬀerent set of
faces (i.e., one saw a set of beautiful male faces, a second one
a set of beautiful females, another one saw a set of average
males and a last one saw a set of average females). Four
groups of women saw exactly the same sets as the above,
with each group seeing only one set. The average faces were
selected from a collection of images available for psychology
experiments (Psychological Image Collection at Sterling, PICS;
http://pics.psych.stir.ac.uk). The beautiful faces were selected
from international print and digital media excluding faces of
famous people.
All the processed photos that were used in the AGL task
were pre-tested by 12 participants (six males and six females)
that did not take part in the main experiment. In this stimulus
test, participants were asked to rate a sample of 60 male and
60 female faces on a scale from 1 = ugly to 7 = beautiful.
The faces that were allocated to the categories of the average
and the beautiful faces were those that received ratings 3–5 and
6–7 from all participants, respectively. Participants conﬁrmed
that none of the selected faces were known or familiar to
them.
Microsoft PowerPoint was used to present both training and
test strings of faces. All face images were cropped around the
hairline and were adjusted to have approximately equal size.
Further, all faces had neutral expression with respect to emotion
and forward eye-gaze. Each face image was converted to black
and white and was placed in a 235 × 314 pixel black background.
Procedure
In the training phase, all participants were informed that they
were about to see sequences of faces of people ordering one drink
after the other at a bar, and were asked to observe them carefully.
Participants sat at approximately 57 cm from the computer
screen. The faces of each training string appeared sequentially in
the vertical middle of a black screen, with each face ﬂashing for
0.75 s. When all faces of a string had appeared, the whole string
remained on the screen for an extra 1.75 s. The training strings of
faces were individually presented on a computer screen and were
separated from each other with a blank screen that appeared for
0.75 s.
After training, participants were informed that the strings
they had seen followed a complex set of rules, but no speciﬁc
information was provided regarding the nature of the rules. Then,
they were asked to determine which of a new set of face strings
followed the rules of the ﬁrst phase and which did not. After
each response, participants had to determine the source of their
knowledge by choosing one of the following categories: guess,
intuition, familiarity, rules, memory. The following clariﬁcations
were given for each category: Choose “guess,” when your response
was based on no information whatsoever, that is, when your
response was completely random, as if you ﬂipped a coin. Choose
“intuition” if you have some conﬁdence in your response, but you
have no idea why your response is correct. Choose “familiarity,” if
a string seems familiar to you, but you cannot explain why this is
so. Choose “rules,” if you feel your response was based on a rule or
set of rules that you learned from the ﬁrst part and that you could
TABLE 1 | Average attractiveness ratings for faces used in the present
study.
Gender of
participants
Gender of
faces
Beauty M N SD
Female Women Average
Beautiful
3.5
6.2
6
6
0.5
0.2
Men Average
Beautiful
3.8
6.3
6
6
0.8
0.2
Male Women Average
Beautiful
3.3
6.1
6
6
0.5
0.2
Men Average
Beautiful
3.7
6.3
6
6
0.5
0.1
report if required. Choose “memory” if it seems to you that your
response was based on memory, that is, if you can remember a
speciﬁc string or part of a string from the ﬁrst part.
Test strings were presented in the same order for all
participants. In addition, test strings appeared in exactly the same
manner as the training strings, with the diﬀerence that each test
string remained on the screen until participants provided their
response and knowledge attribution. No corrective feedback was
provided.
Pre-Test Data
The facial attractiveness ratings that the 12 participants of the pre-
test gave for the 20 faces used in the present study are presented in
Table 1. Further, with respect to the attractiveness assessment of
the 60 male and the 60 female faces of the initial sample of faces,
men’s ratings of male and female faces were (M = 3.4, SD = 0.3)
and (M = 3.6, SD = 0.4) respectively, and women’s ratings of
male and female faces were (M = 3.4, SD = 0.3) and (M = 3.7,
SD = 0.8) respectively.
Results
Classiﬁcation accuracy in terms of grammaticality is used to
assess learning under the diﬀerent conditions. Performance on
the subjective reports is used to assess the implicit (unconscious)
or explicit (conscious) status of the acquired knowledge. For
simplicity, in the following analyses, we will report eﬀects
testing our predictions that performance will be higher (in
terms of the ﬁrst prediction) or lower (in terms of the
second prediction) for beautiful than for average faces and for
beautiful faces of the opposite than of the same sex. Eﬀects
are tested using Bayes factors, B, to assess strength of evidence;
p-values are also reported so readers can in addition assess
signiﬁcance. A B of 3 or above indicates substantial evidence
for the alternative rather than the null hypothesis and of
1/3 or below substantial evidence for the null rather than
alternative hypothesis. Thus, a B between 3 and 1/3 indicates
data insensitivity for distinguishing the alternative and null
hypotheses (see Dienes, 2008, 2014). Bs testing group diﬀerences
are reported for diﬀerences justiﬁed by our predictions regarding
the central issue of this paper, i.e., the eﬀect of same and opposite
sex attractiveness on learning. BH(0,6) refers to a Bayes factor
used to test the hypothesis that there is learning or a diﬀerence
between groups, represented as a half-normal with a SD of
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6% above baseline, against H0, the hypothesis of no diﬀerence.
Following Dienes (2014) when a roughly expected eﬀect size
can be speciﬁed, it is used as the SD of a half-normal. As
the overall mean accuracy for the present data is 56 and 6%
was taken as the rough diﬀerence expected for speciﬁc group
comparisons.
For comparisons between two groups, H1 BH(0,6) refers to
Bayes factor testing the hypotheses that performance will be
higher for beautiful than for average faces and for beautiful
faces of the opposite than of the same sex, whereas H2
BH(0,6) corresponds to Bayes factor testing the hypotheses that
performance will be lower for beautiful than for average faces
and for beautiful faces of the opposite than of the same
sex.
For three-way interactions, H1 suggests that male participants
should demonstrate greater learning for beautiful rather than
average faces of women rather than men as compared to female
participants. H2 represents the opposite direction with female
participants demonstrating greater learning for beautiful rather
than average faces of women rather than men in comparison
to male participants. Similarly, for the two-way interactions, H1
tests whether learning is greater for beautiful rather than average
faces of diﬀerent than of same gender, whereas H2 tests whether
learning is greater for beautiful rather than average faces of same
than of diﬀerent gender.
Classification Performance
A three-way ANOVA on grammaticality accuracy, with
gender of participants (female vs. male), beauty (average
vs. beautiful), and gender (women vs. men) of the faces as
between-participants independent variables revealed a three-
way interaction, F(1,110) = 8.66, p = 0.004, η2p = 0.07, H1
BH(0,6) = 0.22, H2 BH(0,6) = 13.33 (see Figure 1A). The
three-way interaction was decomposed into its two-way partial
interactions.
There was a beauty by gender of faces partial two-way
interaction for the grammaticality accuracy of just female
participants, F(1,58) = 4.56, p = 0.037, η2p = 0.07, H1
BH(0,6) = 0.19, H2 BH(0,6) = 5.31. Female participants classiﬁed
beautiful faces of women more accurately than average faces
of women, with accuracy for the latter type of faces being
marginally greater than chance, t(15)= 2.12, p= 0.052, r2 = 0.23,
BH(0,6) = 4.16 (see Table 2). By contrast, female participants did
not classify beautiful faces of men better than average faces of
men. Thus, only female beauty enhanced women’s performance.
For male participants, there was a gender of faces by beauty
partial two-way interaction on grammaticality accuracy as well,
F(1,52) = 4.10, p = 0.048, η2p = 0.07, H1 BH(0,6) = 0.23, H2
BH(0,6) = 4.27 see Figure 1A). In contrast to female participants,
who classiﬁed beautiful faces of women more accurately than
average faces of women, male participants classiﬁed beautiful
faces of women less accurately than average faces of women
(see Table 2). In fact, evidence of learning was found only
for average women’s faces, with males’ performance exceeding
chance, t(12) = 1.45, p = 0.002, r2 = 0.58, BH(0,6) = 702.1, and
not for beautiful women’s faces, where data indicated insensitivity
as to whether performance exceeded chance, t(15) = 1.45,
TABLE 2 | Summary of statistics testing hypotheses about classification
accuracy.
Gender of
participants
Gender
of faces
F p df η2p H1 BH(0,6) H2 BH (0,6)
Female Women 4.27 0.048 1, 30 0.13 4.6 0.14
Men 1.02 0.321 1, 28 0.04 0.23 1.1
Male Women 5.72 0.024 1, 27 0.18 0.15 8.7
Men 0.20 0.660 1, 25 0.01 0.63 0.33
The reported F tests represent the comparison between average and beautiful
faces for each combination of gender of participants by gender of faces.
p = 0.168, r2 = 0.12, BH(0,6) = 1.49. Further, in contrast to their
performance while classifying women’s faces, male participants
did not classify beautiful faces of men less accurately than average
faces of men. Men’s overall accuracy for male faces regardless of
beauty (55%) exceeded chance, t(26) = 3.14, p= 0.004, r2 = 0.28,
BH(0,6) = 40.5. Again, only female beauty impaired performance
in male participants; that is, female beauty was important for
both male and female participants, but aﬀected them in opposite
directions (see Figure 1A).
Finally, there was no opposite-sex advantage in the
classiﬁcation of beautiful faces for either female or male
participants (both Fs< 1 and H1 BsH(0,6) < 0.33).
Figure 1B depicts an alternative way of illustrating the present
data, with face gender being coded as same vs. opposite to
participants’ gender. Analyses with the particular coding (which
produces the same F ratios just with diﬀerent eﬀects labeled
as diﬀerent orders) yielded insensitive evidence of a three-way
interaction (H1 BH(0,6) = 0.65, H2 BH(0,6) = 0.74); accordingly,
no claim can be made as to whether or not the two-way
interaction is diﬀerent for the diﬀerent genders. For a detailed
interpretation of the plotting depicted in Figure 1B, see the
Section “General Discussion.”
Overall, females demonstrated the lowest performance when
classifying average faces of women, presumably because these
were the least interesting faces for females. Further, female
participants classiﬁed beautiful faces more accurately than
average faces, even though this was true only for same-sex faces,
conﬁrming the prediction that beauty would increase perceptual
learning and performance (as indicated by both ps and Bs). On
the other hand, male participants did not show an analogous
advantage in classifying beautiful over average faces in either of
the two face genders. On the contrary, and in contrast to what
one would expect, males’ lowest performance was in classifying
what is generally considered the most attractive type of faces
for male participants, namely beautiful faces of women. Thus,
male participants’ results conﬁrmed the prediction that high
incentive salience would interfere with perceptual processing
(again conﬁrmed by both ps and Bs). Overall, female beauty
inﬂuenced classiﬁcation accuracy in both males and females, but
in exactly the opposite direction, and in a way that male beauty
did not.
Finally, the overall pattern of classiﬁcation performance
suggests that AGL performance involves more than a pure liking
process, that is, more than what is involved in an esthetic
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FIGURE 1 | (A) Mean grammaticality accuracy of males (a) and females
(b) for beautiful vs. average faces of men and women. Error bars indicate
±1 SE. Asterisks denote significant differences from a chance level of
50% (∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05). (B) Mean grammaticality accuracy of
males (a) and females (b) for beautiful vs. average faces coded as same
vs. opposite to participants’ gender. Error bars indicate ±1 SE. Asterisks
denote significant differences from a chance level of 50% (∗∗p < 0.01;
∗p < 0.05).
judgment task, as there is ample evidence that men and women
agree on attractiveness judgments (e.g., Langlois et al., 2000;
Kranz and Ishai, 2006; Ishai, 2007; Levy et al., 2008).
Subjective Measures of Awareness
The analysis of participants’ accuracy for all the attributional
categories was used to measure the conscious status of
participants’ knowledge. The knowledge of the structure of
the training items that participants acquire constitutes the
structural knowledge and may consist of diﬀerent knowledge
types (e.g., knowledge of fragments or of whole items, knowledge
of other rules, etc.). Here we make no speciﬁc assumptions
as to the exact content of participants’ structural knowledge.
The knowledge of whether test items have the structure of
training items forms participants’ judgment knowledge (see
Dienes and Scott, 2005 about the distinction between structural
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and judgment knowledge). The analyses of participants’
knowledge attributions allow us to make conclusions about
the consciousness of both structural and judgment knowledge.
Guessing attributions correspond to unconscious structural and
unconscious judgment knowledge. Familiarity and intuition
attributions reﬂect unconscious structural and conscious
judgment knowledge. Finally, rules and memory attributions
reﬂect conscious structural and conscious judgment knowledge.
The above three possible categories of the (un)consciousness
of knowledge will be followed while analyzing participants’
knowledge attributions. First, we present the percentage of all
attribution categories.
Frequency of Knowledge Attributions
The guess, intuition and familiarity knowledge attributions
were combined to create implicit attribution scores, and rules
and memory attributions were combined to create explicit
attribution scores. A three-way ANOVAon percentage of implicit
attributions, with gender of participants, face gender, and beauty
(average vs. beautiful) as independent variables revealed only a
signiﬁcant main eﬀect of participants’ gender, F(1,110) = 5.44,
p = 0.022, η2p = 0.05, BN(0,15) = 3.19. Female participants gave
signiﬁcantly more implicit attributions than male participants
(72% vs. 63%). The frequencies of all ﬁve knowledge attributions
for the two genders are shown in Figure 2.
(For the estimation of B in this case, the alternative was
modeled as a normal centered on zero with an SD of 15, i.e.,
the predictions were not directional. Setting the SD to this value
implies that changes up to 30% in either direction are plausible;
and that is about as large as the changes could be, keeping
predictions symmetrical, given mean values of around 70%.)
The (Un)Consciousness of Knowledge
Only 62 of the 118 participants had classiﬁcation accuracy data
in all ﬁve attributions. Therefore, the three implicit attributions
(guess, intuition, and familiarity) were collapsed, and the same
was done for the two explicit ones (rules and memory), which
resulted in an ANOVA with N = 110 participants. The four-
way ANOVA on accuracy with gender of participants, gender
of faces, beauty (average vs. beautiful), and attribution type
(implicit vs. explicit) as independent variables showed only a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of attribution, F(1,102) = 18.58, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.15, BH(0,10) = 2854.80. (Dienes and Scott, 2005, found
an eﬀect of attribution of 10%; this value was used for modeling
the predictions of the alternative hypothesis while calculating
B in this case.) Explicit attributions were accompanied by
signiﬁcantly higher accuracy than implicit attributions (61% vs.
54%). Accuracy was signiﬁcantly higher than chance in both the
former, t(109) = 8.02, p < 0.001, r2 = 0.37, BH(0,6) = 9.0∗1012,
and the latter attribution types, t(109) = 4.83, p < 0.001,
r2 = 0.18, BH(0,6) = 24349.00. Thus, participants acquired both
implicit and explicit structural knowledge.
In order to get a clearer picture of participants’ implicit
and explicit knowledge, we analyzed accuracy for the diﬀerent
knowledge attributions relying on the diﬀerent combinations of
unconscious and conscious structural and judgment knowledge
as these were deﬁned above.
Unconscious structural and unconscious judgment
knowledge
The 2 × 2 × 2 [gender of participants (males vs. females)
by gender of faces (women vs. men) by beauty (average vs.
beautiful)] analysis of accuracy just for guess attributions revealed
no signiﬁcant eﬀects or interactions, Fs < 2, ps > 0.10 (see
Figure 3).
The data were insensitive for indicating whether or not
participants’ overall accuracy for guess attributions (52%)
exceeded chance, t(106) = 0.99, p = 0.324, r2 = 0.01,
BH(0,6) = 0.77.
Unconscious structural and conscious judgment
knowledge
As previously stated, H1 B tests the hypotheses that performance
will be higher for beautiful than for average faces and H2 B
the opposite. For two-way interactions, H1 and H2 test whether
learning is greatest for beautiful faces of diﬀerent than of same
gender and of same than of diﬀerent gender respectively. For
the three-way interaction, H1 tests whether males demonstrate
an advantage for beautiful over average faces of women rather
than men as compared to female participants. H2 represents the
opposite direction.
The three-way analysis of accuracy for only intuition and
familiarity attributions combined together revealed a three-
way interaction, F(1,108) = 4.79, p = 0.031, η2p = 0.04, H1
BH(0,6) = 0.35, H2 BH(0,6) = 3.52 (see Figure 4). The three-way
interaction was decomposed into partial two-way interactions.
The analysis of female participants’ data showed insensitive
evidence for a gender of face by beauty two-way interaction,
F(1,57) = 0.66, p = 0.42, η2p = 0.01, H1 BH(0,6) = 0.46, H2
BH(0,6) = 1.19. Their overall accuracy for intuition and familiarity
combined together (56%) exceeded chance, t(60) = 4.21,
r2 = 0.23, p < 0.001, BH(0,6) = 2754, providing evidence of
unconscious structural knowledge.
The analysis of male participants’ accuracy for only intuition
and familiarity attributions combined together yielded a gender
of faces by beauty interaction, F(1,51) = 5.77, p = 0.020,
TABLE 3 | Summary of statistics testing hypotheses about unconscious
and conscious structural knowledge.
Gender of
participants
Gender
of faces
F p df η2p H1 BH(0,6) H2 BH(0,6)
Unconscious structural knowledge
Female Women – – – – – –
Men – – – – – –
Male Women 2.77 0.108 1, 26 0.10 0.23 2.65
Men 3.05 0.093 1, 25 0.11 2.93 0.21
Conscious structural knowledge
Female Women 4.06 0.054 1, 27 0.13 4.04 0.25
Men 3.86 0.060 1, 26 0.13 0.34 3.13
Male Women – – – – – –
Men – – – – – –
Unconscious structural knowledge here includes only the combination of intuition
and familiarity attributions. Blank cells indicate insensitive evidence of two-way
interactions, which were thus not followed by one-way ANOVAs.
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FIGURE 2 | Percentage of knowledge attributions in males (A) and females (B). Error bars indicate ±1 SE.
FIGURE 3 | Mean accuracy when males (A) and females (B) provided unconscious structural and judgment knowledge (i.e., guess) attributions in the
four different stimulus categories. Error bars indicate ±1 SE.
η2p = 0.10, H1 BH(0,6) = 0.24, H2 BH(0,6) = 6.39 (see Figure 4).
Male participants were not more accurate in their implicit
knowledge for beautiful rather than average faces of women, (see
Table 3). Further, their implicit knowledge was not less accurate
for beautiful than average faces of men. Finally, males’ data were
insensitive for determining an eﬀect of face gender for beautiful
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FIGURE 4 | Mean accuracy when males (A) and females (B) provided unconscious structural knowledge (i.e., intuition and familiarity) attributions in
the four different stimulus categories. Error bars indicate ±1 SE. Asterisks denote significant differences from a chance level of 50% (∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05).
faces, F(1,27) = 0.01, p = 0.917, η2p < 0.001, H1 BH(0,6) = 0.58,
H2 BH(0,6) = 0.50, or whether males’ implicit knowledge accuracy
for beautiful faces overall (54%) exceeded chance, t(28) = 1.90,
p = 0.068, r2 = 0.11, BH(0,6) = 2.7.
In sum, both males and females acquired unconscious
structural knowledge. Importantly, for male participants, beauty
impaired the unconscious structural knowledge of women’s faces
more thanmen’s faces. Further, the extent to which this happened
for males was greater than for females (for whom it may
even have gone in the other direction). Thus, beauty aﬀected
the unconscious structural knowledge of males and females
diﬀerently.
Conscious structural and conscious judgment knowledge
Again, note that H1 tests whether there is an advantage for
beautiful over average faces and H2 the opposite. For two-way
interactions, H1 and H2 test whether learning is greatest for
beautiful faces of diﬀerent than of same gender and of same than
of diﬀerent gender respectively. For the three-way interaction, H1
tests whether males demonstrate an advantage for beautiful over
average faces of women rather than men as compared to females.
H2 represents the opposite direction.
The analysis of accuracy just for rules and memory
attributions combined together revealed a signiﬁcant
three-way interaction, F(1,108) = 7.05, p = 0.009,
η2p = 0.10, H1 BH(0,6) = 0.40, H2 BH(0,6) = 3.64 (see
Figure 5).
As before, the three-way interaction was decomposed into
partial two-way interactions. The analysis of female participants’
data yielded a face gender by beauty interaction on accuracy
of explicit structural knowledge, F(1,53) = 7.75, p = 0.007,
η2p = 0.13, H1 BH(0,6) = 0.32, H2 BH(0,6) = 5.68. Females’
accuracy of explicit knowledge for beautiful faces of women
was higher than the corresponding accuracy for average faces
of women (marginal by signiﬁcance test; see Table 3). Further,
females’ accuracy of explicit knowledge was (marginally) lower
for beautiful than average faces of men. There was no substantial
evidence of a face gender eﬀect on females’ explicit knowledge
of beautiful faces, F(1,26) = 3.22, p = 0.084, η2p = 0.11, H1
BH(0,6) = 0.35, H2 BH(0,6) = 2.72.
The analysis of male participants’ accuracy of explicit
structural knowledge yielded insensitive evidence for an
interaction, F(1,49) = 0.61, p = 0.439, η2p = 0.01, H1
BH(0,6) = 0.50, H2 BH(0,6) = 1.18. Their overall accuracy
for rules and memory attributions combined together (59%)
exceeded chance, t(52) = 5.54, p < 0.001, r2 = 0.37, BH(0,6) =
965736.
Overall, both males and females acquired conscious structural
knowledge of faces. Further, in line with their classiﬁcation
accuracy, females’ explicit structural knowledge for beautiful
faces of women was higher than the corresponding accuracy
for average faces of women. For women, the facilitatory eﬀect
of beauty on conscious structural knowledge for female faces
was greater than for male faces. Further, the extent of this
eﬀect was greater for female than male participants (who may
even have gone in the opposite direction). Beauty aﬀected
the conscious structural knowledge of males and females
diﬀerently.
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FIGURE 5 | Mean accuracy when males (A) and females (B) provided conscious structural knowledge (i.e., rules and memory) attributions in the four
different stimulus categories. Error bars indicate ±1 SE. Asterisks denote significant differences from a chance level of 50% (∗∗p < 0.01; ∗p < 0.05).
General Discussion
The present work aimed at exploring the eﬀect of facial
attractiveness, that is, of stimuli with high incentive salience on
the acquisition of implicit and explicit knowledge acquired in an
AGL task. Our ﬁndings are discussed with respect to theoretical
views about possible gender diﬀerences in the way and the degree
in which same- and opposite-sex facial attractiveness captures
people’s attention and thus determines the incentive salience
of attractiveness. Accordingly, the discussion also touches upon
the relation of attention and AGL, without of course seeking
or being able to provide conclusive answers about this intricate
relation.
The overall pattern of ﬁndings revealed that (opposite-
sex) facial attractiveness interfered with male participants’
classiﬁcation accuracy and unconscious knowledge. In
particular, the classiﬁcation performance results showed
that male participants demonstrated the lowest accuracy while
classifying beautiful faces of women. Further, beauty impaired
the unconscious structural knowledge (i.e., accuracy in the
combination of intuition and familiarity attributions) of women’s
faces more than men’s faces for male participants. This occurred
to a greater extent for males than for females. Conversely, female
participants demonstrated greater classiﬁcation accuracy and
explicit knowledge for beautiful than for average faces of the
same sex. First of all, opposite-sex attractiveness as well as
same-sex attractiveness may exert diﬀerent motivating inﬂuence
on men and women and consequently lead to diﬀerent cognitive
processing modes in the two genders, a possibility that is
examined in detail below. Secondly, a related issue concerns the
eﬀect that attention generally demonstrated to be captured by
attractive faces (e.g., Langlois et al., 1987, 1991; Maner et al.,
2003) has on perceptual processing and more speciﬁcally on
implicit and explicit AGL. The two issues are examined in turn
below.
The Effect of Motivational Gender Differences
on (Un)Consciousness
Maner et al. (2003; see also Neuberg et al., 2004) have summed
up previous research on mating-relevant goals in the two genders
under the following evolutionary-based hypotheses concerning
gender diﬀerences in selective processing of attractive men and
women. The opposite-sex beauty captures the eye hypothesis is in
line with theoretical and empirical evidence than both genders
exhibit great sensitivity toward opposite-sex attractiveness.
According to the one-sided gender bias hypothesis, men are more
likely to selectively focus on opposite-sex attractiveness than are
women. Finally, on the female beauty captures the eye hypothesis,
both genders selectively attend to attractive faces of women for
diﬀerent reasons: men motivated by mate-search motives and
women because they view women as competitors.
The current research suggests that incentive salience
instantiated by attractive faces of same and opposite sex exerts
diﬀerent inﬂuence on cognitive processing. With respect to
opposite-sex attractiveness, in particular, the present ﬁndings
are consistent with hypotheses and corresponding empirical
evidence suggesting that men and women value physical
attractiveness in a diﬀerent way when selecting mates. Several
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studies have shown that men exhibit greater sensitivity to viewing
attractive faces of the opposite sex than women do (Hayden
et al., 2007). Further, it has been found that males, but not
females, are willing to discount higher future rewards for smaller
immediate ones when they view attractive faces of the opposite
sex (Wilson and Daly, 2004). In addition, Levy et al. (2008) have
shown that men exerted greater motivational eﬀort for viewing
beautiful images of the opposite sex than did women. Along
the same lines, it has been suggested that, when selecting mates,
men rely on attractiveness whereas women give emphasis on
resources (e.g., Sadalla et al., 1987; Buss, 1989, 1999; Li et al.,
2002; see also Cloutier et al., 2008 for evidence of fMRI activation
of OFC, i.e., a reward-related brain region, during processing
facial attractiveness, only in male participants). On this mate
selection theory, the present ﬁndings suggest that the increased
motivational value that opposite-sex beauty has for men leads
to a detrimental eﬀect on their performance in an AGL task. In
particular, there was evidence of opposite-sex beauty impairing
mostly male participants’ performance. In particular, opposite-
sex beauty interfered with male participants’ classiﬁcation
accuracy. Further, beauty impaired their unconscious structural
knowledge of women’s faces more than men’s faces. The above
diﬀerence was greater for male than for female participants (for
whom the above diﬀerence may even have gone in the other
direction).
Another possible diﬀerence between the two genders concerns
the eﬀect of same-sex attractiveness on performance. Evidence
of an eﬀect of same-sex beauty was found only in females’ and
not in males’ performance. In particular, female participants
demonstrated higher classiﬁcation accuracy and a (marginally)
greater amount of explicit structural knowledge for beautiful over
average faces of women.
However, the above diﬀerences with respect to the eﬀect of
same- and opposite-sex attractiveness on the performance of
males and females, at the same time, point to a similar pattern in
the performance of the two genders in that the data of both males
and females provide converging evidence of the female beauty
captures the eye hypothesis. Indeed, both genders demonstrated
the sensitivity toward female beauty that the above hypothesis
entails. In particular, female participants demonstrated greater
classiﬁcation accuracy and explicit knowledge for beautiful
than for average faces of women. On the other hand, males
demonstrated a reduced classiﬁcation accuracy for beautiful
over average faces of women. Further, beauty impaired their
unconscious structural knowledge of women’s faces more than
men’s faces. Thus, it seems that female beauty captured the
attention of both genders, with the diﬀerence that in females it
led to an advantage, whereas in men to a disadvantage. It has
been suggested that not only men but also women demonstrate
an increased selective attention and recognition memory for
attractive faces of women (e.g., Shepherd and Ellis, 1973; Maner
et al., 2003; Becker et al., 2005). These ﬁndings are consistent
with females’ increased explicit knowledge of attractive faces
of women (as measured by accuracy for rules and memory
attributions). The salience of attractive women for other women
may originate from amate value self-assessmentmotive or from a
motive of mate guarding from potential competitors (cf. Buss and
Shackelford, 1997; Gutierres et al., 1999). The latter possibility
is consistent with Becerra et al. (2001) ﬁndings suggesting that
there may be a shared neural system for the evaluation of
aversive and rewarding stimuli. By contrast, the salience of
attractive women for men may originate from a mate-search
motive.
Apart from the female beauty captures the eye hypothesis,
the present ﬁndings are consistent with the one-sided gender
bias hypothesis, according to which men are more likely
to selectively focus on opposite-sex beauty than are women.
By contrast, our ﬁndings do not support the opposite-sex
beauty captures the eye hypothesis, according to which both
genders should demonstrate great sensitivity toward opposite-sex
attractiveness.
The diﬀerence in the way same-sex attractiveness as well
as opposite-sex attractiveness aﬀected the performance of the
two genders may be explained by research providing evidence
that women do not process opposite- and same-sex stimuli in
the manner men do (e.g., Maner et al., 2003; Cloutier et al.,
2008; Franklin and Adams, 2009; see also Rupp and Wallen,
2008). Thus, attractive faces might have a diﬀerent reward
value for men and women. Alternatively, it could be argued
that women rely more on esthetic aspects of attractiveness of
both sexes (which may or may not have a sexual reward value
cf. Franklin and Adams, 2009), whereas men focus more on
sexual reward-based aspects of stimuli. The above dissociation
resembles the dissociation between “liking” and “wanting”
described by Berridge (2000) and might be responsible for
the gender diﬀerences in the processing of attractive men and
women.
An alternative interpretation of the present data is also
plausible. We found that for men opposite-sex beautiful vs.
average faces impaired performance. For women, the same
contrast was insensitive. Thus, it remains open whether or not
for women opposite-sex beautiful vs. average faces impaired
performance. According to the female beauty captures the eye
hypothesis, the null hypothesis is true for this last contrast. But
the evidence allows the null to be true or false. Similarly, we found
that for women same-sex beautiful vs. average faces facilitated
performance. For men, the same contrast was insensitive. Thus,
it remains open whether or not for men same-sex beautiful vs.
average faces facilitated performance. According to the female
beauty captures the eye hypothesis, the null hypothesis is true
for this last contrast. But the evidence allows the null to be
true or false. Figure 1B emphasizes the extent to which for
opposite-sex faces, beauty seems to inhibit performance, whereas
for same-sex ones the opposite is true. The above diﬀerences
may be independent of participants’ gender. Overall, it could
be argued that the increased incentive salience of opposite-
sex attractiveness functions as a distractor that eliminates
perceptual resources, thereby harming performance. By contrast,
attractive faces of the same sex (as well as average faces of
the same sex) presumably have a lower incentive salience that
broadens attentional and cognitive resources, thereby enhancing
learning.
In sum, the theory that relates high and low motivational
intensity with the narrowing or broadening of attentional
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and cognitive resources respectively (Gable and Harmon-Jones,
2010b) may apply to both genders equally. Further research
is needed to distinguish this theory from the female beauty
captures the eye theory, as both survive the tests in this
study.
An alternative mechanism that might have played a speciﬁc
or greater role in the inﬂuences of opposite-sex attractiveness
on AGL performance is based on the eﬀect of beauty on
implicit preferences. A well-established ﬁnding in the implicit
learning literature is an increased liking for grammatical over
ungrammatical strings of an AG (see e.g., Zizak and Reber, 2004).
Such implicit preferences could have facilitated classiﬁcation
performance in the test phase. However, test strings that consist
of attractive faces of the opposite sex, namely of faces that are
thought to be generally preferred might have interfered with
participants’ implicit preferences guiding their judgments, which
in turn could account for a disadvantage in the classiﬁcation of
attractive over average faces of the opposite sex.
Attractiveness, Attention, and Cognitive
Processing
The predictions of the present study were formulated on the
basis of the possible ways in which the incentive salience of
attractive faces might guide attention, which in turn could play a
central role in the acquisition of implicit and explicit knowledge.
On the one hand, it was hypothesized that if incentive salience
increased perceptual processing, implicit learning would increase
for attractive rather than average faces, especially of the opposite
sex. On the other hand, if incentive salience narrowed the breadth
of perceptual processing, with participants selectively attending
to arousing information, like the physical characteristics of
beautiful faces rather than to the task-relevant order of faces,
performance might be impaired.
Male participants’ reduced classiﬁcation accuracy for
attractive faces of women as well as the greater interference
eﬀect that beauty had on unconscious structural knowledge of
women’s faces rather than men’s faces for males as compared
to females supports the second hypothesis and theoretical and
empirical data that are consistent with it. Thus, according to
Easterbrook’s (1959) hypothesis, arousing stimuli reduce the
range of perceptual focus (by excluding less arousing, irrelevant,
or peripheral information). As Easterbrook (1959) notes, this
narrowing of attention caused by emotional arousal can have
a positive eﬀect in some tasks, but, in most cases, it inhibits
performance. It should be noted that Easterbrook’s (1959)
hypothesis related to negative aﬀect only. However, other
researchers (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008, 2010a,b; Harmon-
Jones and Gable, 2009; see also Levine and Edelstein, 2009) have
shown that stimuli with high motivational intensity reduce the
breadth of attention, in both withdrawal motivation (inherent to
negative aﬀect stimuli) and in approach motivation (inherent to
positive aﬀect stimuli). Further, it has been shown that men are
more likely to drift into sexual fantasies by an external trigger
(e.g., relevant visual stimuli) than women are (Ellis and Symons,
1990; Jones and Barlow, 1990). Accordingly, male participants
might have had a reduction in the visual resources/perceptual
attention toward attractive female faces, which might explain
their low classiﬁcation (and implicit knowledge) accuracy for
these faces.
This attentional narrowing during the processing of
emotional and highly motivating stimuli (attractive faces),
which presumably interfered with perceptual processing and
accordingly with implicit learning, could at the same time
be associated with an elaborate processing of the stimuli
or dimensions attended to, which, in turn, might explain
male participants’ intact explicit knowledge for these faces.
Consistently, many studies have found enhanced memory for
emotional stimuli (see Levine and Edelstein, 2009, for a review of
such studies).
Along similar lines to the attentional narrowing hypothesis,
is a theoretical interpretation derived from the research ﬁeld
of AGL, which also gives emphasis on the exclusion of goal
irrelevant information during learning. In particular, Tanaka
et al. (2008), Eitam et al. (2009) and Kiyokawa et al. (2012)
provide strong evidence that directing participants’ attention to
goal relevant dimensions of the stimuli is a prerequisite for
implicit AGL. Instructing participants to attend to stimuli may
be one way of rendering stimuli goal relevant (Eitam et al., 2009),
but it is not the only one. Reward-based sexual processes may
be viewed as another way of relating stimuli to people’s goals.
Thus, men’s selective attention might have focused on goal- and
reward-relevant physical characteristics of beautiful faces (i.e., on
irrelevant dimensions of the task), which might have interfered
with attention on the relevant aspects of the task (e.g., the order
of faces), and accordingly with AGL in general and with implicit
learning in particular.
Female participants’ performance, and in particular, their
processing advantage for attractive over average faces of women
(in terms of their classiﬁcation accuracy and their explicit
structural knowledge) is consistent with the hypothesis that
incentive salience (in this case originating from a mate-guarding
motive) would increase perceptual processing and accordingly
performance in the AGL task. If females focused more on the
esthetic rather than the motivational aspect of beauty while
attending to attractive faces of women, this might have led to
the broadening of attention. Indeed, it has been shown that it is
the motivational aspect (i.e., desire) of positive aﬀect that leads
to attentional narrowing, whereas positive aﬀect of low approach
motivation (e.g., pleasure) leads to attentional and cognitive
broadening (Gable and Harmon-Jones, 2008).
The increase in female participants’ explicit knowledge
while classifying attractive faces of females and their intact
implicit knowledge is also consistent with the hypothesis that
incentive salience would increase executive processing, that is
attentional resources rather than perceptual resources. Further, as
mentioned above, this increased explicit knowledge is consistent
with research showing that women (like men) demonstrate
an increased selective attention and recognition memory for
attractive female faces (e.g., Shepherd and Ellis, 1973;Maner et al.,
2003).
Finally, the fact that female participants demonstrated the
opposite pattern for explicit knowledge of men’s faces (with
marginally decreased explicit knowledge for attractive relative
to average male faces) may be due to a diﬀerence in women’s
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strategies while processing facial attractiveness of the two sexes,
and in particular, in the balance between the esthetic and sexual
reward value involved in this processing.
It should be noted again that all the above interpretations
concerning the eﬀect of beauty on the implicit and explicit
processing of same- and opposite-sex faces in each participants’
gendermight hold true for both genders. The present data cannot
rule out either of the two possibilities.
Conclusion
This study examined whether the processing of incentive salience
instantiated by facial attractiveness leads to explicit and/or
implicit knowledge acquired in an AGL task and whether this
processing is diﬀerentially aﬀected by the gender of participants
depending on the sex of the attractive faces. Our ﬁndings revealed
both gender similarities and diﬀerences in the processing of
facial attractiveness. More speciﬁcally, the overall pattern of
participants’ performance suggests that female beauty captured
the attention of both genders. However, this increased sensitivity
toward female beauty aﬀected performance of the two genders in
opposite directions. On the one hand, the overall performance
of male participants suggests that incentive salience interferes
with perceptual processing, presumably because the increased
rewarding value that attractive faces of women has for men
narrows the breadth of perceptual focus. Such an attentional
narrowing interfered with performance in AGL and in particular
with implicit learning, which has been shown to rely on
perceptual resources (e.g., Tanaka et al., 2008; Eitam et al.,
2009). On the other hand, the increased classiﬁcation accuracy
and explicit structural knowledge that female participants
demonstrated for attractive over average faces of women,
that is for motivationally salient stimuli depicting potential
competitors for women is in line with the hypothesis that
incentive salience would increase perceptual processing as well
as attentional resources. Presumably, the two genders diﬀer in
the degree to which they rely on esthetic and rewarding aspects
of beauty or on liking and wanting processes, which in turn
might diﬀerentially aﬀect conscious and unconscious processing.
Future work could identify the mechanisms allowing same- or
opposite-sex attractiveness to exert such a diﬀerent inﬂuence
on the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge in
men and women, thereby illuminating the intriguing relation of
consciousness and motivating stimuli with important cognitive
and societal implications.
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